Abstract: This paper describes a project that integrates real devices used in the electric power grid with a simulation of electrical power generation and distribution, and a computer/communication simulator. The testbed is designed to evaluate the cyber-security of power grid control systems. Through a combination of simulation and emulation, the testbed seamlessly integrates virtual and real components, allowing for the evaluation of both high-level design descriptions on large-scale models, and precise measurements taken from production code executing on real hardware.
Introduction
Electrical power generation and distribution is the most critical of our nation's critical infrastructures. Computers monitor the state of the system, networks distribute data and control signals throughout the network. Until recently the data rates and volumes were so low that all necessary communication could be carried by leased telephone lines. However, more sophisticated technology is now being developed and deployed that requires more data, faster, and from more locations. There is a push then towards more sophisticated networking. Indeed, modern equipment is now sold with ethernet ports, and wireless access. The day is past when the power grid system might be thought of as 'safe' because physical barriers made it too difficult for an outsider to gain remote access.
The Trustworthy Cyber-Infrastructure for Power (TCIP) project (UIUC, 2008) centred at the University of Illinois is funded by the National Science Foundation, Department of Energy, and Department of Homeland Security to examine cyber-security issues in the electric power grid. TCIP is developing new security technologies for power grid control architectures, and means of evaluating those technologies. A key element for evaluation is a testbed that hosts new technologies or accurate models of them, that measures salient operational features of a system with these technologies, that subjects the designs to stresses consistent with cyber-attacks, and evaluates the effectiveness of the defenses, or the resiliency of the system. We are presently developing such a testbed. It integrates: (1) actual relays, data aggregators, and control stations used in the power system with (2) a simulator of power generation and distribution, and (3) a simulator/emulator of computers, sensors, and networks used to control the power grid. Through a combination of simulation and emulation, the testbed seamlessly integrates virtual and real components, allowing for the evaluation of both high level design descriptions on large-scale system models, and precise measurements taking from production code executing on real hardware. This paper describes the testbed architecture, the interfaces and information flow between its components, and a specific scenario we have developed to illustrate its capabilities.
Testbed components

PowerWorld
The PowerWorld simulator was developed first as a research tool at the University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, and has since become commercialised. PowerWorld is an interactive package that simulates high voltage power generation and distribution. PowerWorld analyses a power grid topology comprised of generators, distribution lines, and relays. A bus is a point in the distribution network where a high voltage electrical flow is transformed into multiple lower level flows, so that flows on different lines defining a bus have different characteristics. PowerWorld is capable of simulating networks with up to 100 000 buses. At the heart of PowerWorld is a steady-state solution engine that computes electrical flow characteristics (e.g., line flows, bus voltages, and bus angles) throughout a power grid network, as a function of the demand on the network for power (the 'load'), the power being generated and injected into the network by generators, line capacities, and the network topology.
PowerWorld runs on an ordinary PC or workstation. Figure 1 illustrates a screen-shot of a system typical of a small city. The green arrowheads illustrate electrical flow, the size of the arrowhead conveys the relative value of current (larger arrowhead meaning greater current). Round white and black icons with a tilted bar in the interior represent generators; thin arrowheads that point to nothing represent points where load is drawn off the network. The round icons with blue are pie-charts, where the fraction of circle filled with blue represents the fraction the line capacity for carrying current that is being used. The small red dots represent circuit breakers where a flow can be mechanically interrupted. Although unreadable here, some points (particularly where current enters and exits the network) are labelled with numerical characteristics of the flows there. We use a customised version of PowerWorld which can communicate the values it computes to other programs, using a network, and which can alter the state of the breakers (open or closed) by direction from another program. This customisation allows electrical state information computed by PowerWorld to be used to affect power grid devices, and allows changes in the state of a real or simulated relay to affect the computation performed by PowerWorld.
Power grid equipment
Power flows follow physical law passing through a network, and a change in the flow topology at one spot -e.g., a tree falls on a line and causes a short circuit -reroutes the interrupted flow through other lines. A piece of electrical power equipment can be damaged when the flow through it is outside of design parameters, so unscheduled changes in topology must be anticipated and protected against. Circuit breakers are placed throughout a network to protect lines and devices from faults. Flow does not pass through a breaker that has been opened. Each breaker is controlled by a computer known as a relay. This continuously senses the state of current and voltage of the flow, and opens the breaker if the flow behaves abnormally, e.g., the current increases past some threshold or the voltage drops below a threshold. On external command a relay can also close the breaker, and so re-enable the flow through it (Glover et al., 2007) . Since a relay is fully aware of the state of the breaker it controls, our testbed does not need or use actual breaker devices. For our purposes it suffices to know what control the relay last applied to a breaker, should there be one.
Relays in laboratory testing are not connected to flows in the same way as they are in the power grid. They are typically built so they can be configured to respond to low power waveforms that simulate high power flows. An Adaptive Multichannel Source (AMS) is marketed specifically for testing. An AMS is a controllable inverter (DC to AC converter) whose output is connected to a relay. The AMS executes a simple assembly-like language that includes a command to output three sine waves with a particular amplitude and phase (relative to each other). This is an analog simulation of the three lines and phases used in high power distribution. The signals are interpreted by the relay as signals coming from a current transformer or a voltage transformer.
We interface PowerWorld with the AMS through a converter program that runs on a PC, typically the same one that PowerWorld runs on. PowerWorld and the converter program communicate using network sockets, executing a custom protocol carried by TCP/IP. The converter program polls PowerWorld for a description of the flow through a specific line, then in turn issues a command to the AMS to output sine waves that emulate that magnitude. The relay responds to these changes as it is configured to do.
The relay sends a status signal to the AMS through a line whose voltage level indicates whether the breaker is open or closed. The AMS monitors output and constantly sends status messages back to the converter program. Parsing the input from the relay, the converter program is able to detect when the relay state has changed, and when it does, the converter program notifies PowerWorld which then makes the corresponding topology change in its state.
This The relationships between PowerWorld, the relay, and the AMS are illustrated in Figure 2 . As noted before, the breaker does not actually exist. It is illustrated here with dashed lines to indicate its logical presence but lack of physical presence. A substation in the power grid is a location where flows pass through transformers to either decrease or increase the voltage; relays and breakers are positioned within a substation. Figure 3 illustrates some devices that might be networked together in a substation. Remote Terminal Units (RTUs) are microprocessor controlled devices that interface monitored objects with a distributed control system. An RTU has communication interfaces such as RS232 and Ethernet, and runs protocols designed specifically for use in control systems (e.g., DNP.org, 2008; Modbus.org, 2005) . The diagram includes an RTU with a modem, as dial-in access is common. The network links to the switch are Ethernet.
The Data Aggregator is a computer that continuously gathers state data from the RTUs and relays. This data is available to a control station which collects such data from multiple substations. Operators at the control station monitor this data, and send control messages back to the substations as needed (e.g., to direct a relay to open or close a breaker). The Energy Management System (EMS) sits at the top of the power system control architecture (Wu et al., 2005) . It is the system that operators use to collect data, monitor the system, and analyse the system. The EMS is located in a control centre.
The EMS is partitioned into several processes, each responsible for a particular functionality. These processes run on a single server or are distributed across several servers. For the relatively small systems modelled in our lab, multiple servers are unnecessary. The basic responsibilities of an EMS system are: bring back data from the field send commands out into the field provide an interface for the operators to view and interact with data provide advanced applications like state estimation and contingency analysis.
The process responsible for retrieving data from the RTUs in the field is the Front End Processor (FEP). The FEP is responsible for understanding the various communications protocols and maintaining the communications channels to the various field devices. The FEP is also responsible for sending commands out into the field.
Once the data is retrieved by the FEP, it is logically mapped onto the various devices associated with the data, enabling the data to be fed to displays and advanced applications. Alarms may also be generated at this point.
The EMS operator interface is a client application that connects to processes on the EMS server. The operator interface displays are filled with data fetched by the FEP. Several access levels allow for varying levels of control, as well as areas of responsibility which are used to divide the system into pieces among different operators.
The EMS includes advanced applications such as state estimation and contingency analysis. State estimation is the procedure by which the retrieved data is fit onto a power system model (Wood and Wollenberg, 1996) . State estimation is a crucial tool for operators to understand what is happening in the grid, and its failure can lead to disaster. Indeed, failure of a state estimator was part of the sequence of events that lead up to the widespread 14 August 2003 blackout. Contingency analysis runs a series of what if simulations, designed to gauge the response of the power system to various disturbances (Wood and Wollenberg, 1996) . For example, contingency analysis is used to tell if the system will be able to withstand the loss of the largest generator and still remain operational.
Special protocols are used for communication between devices (e.g., RTUs) within a substation, and between the EMS and devices in substation. It is a simple protocol, designed to optimise the communications between control system devices. DNP3 has implementations that work over serial lines, as well as over IP using TCP or UDP.
A DNP3 connection has one end playing the role of 'master' (for example the control centre), with the other end being a 'slave' or 'outstation' (for example an RTU or IED in the field). In our lab DNP3 over TCP/IP is used to transmit data between the relays and the data aggregator, as well as between the data aggregator and the control centre. In the former case the data aggregator is the master, with relays being slaves, while in the latter case the control centre is the master while the data aggregator is slave. This arrangement is illustrated in Figure 4 . Under DNP3 a master views a slave as a memory that holds arrays of values. Each different elemental data type (e.g., floating point, integer, Boolean) has its own array. A master commands a slave to deliver the data elements in the arrays the master specifies, at the array indices that the master specifies. There exists a shared understood mapping of physical sensor values (e.g., power at line A in substation B) to positions within a slave's memory. So with reference to the figure above, the data aggregator requests data in an array-index coordinate system that is local to a slave device but is known to the data aggregator, and then stores it in array-index coordinate system that is local to the data aggregator, but is known to the control station. When the control station is master and data aggregator is slave, the control station requests that data in terms of the data aggregator's mapping of data to array elements. It is important to note that there is no self description or meta data transmitted along with the values, thus maintaining the lists becomes critical to interpreting the values. Figure 5 highlights the distinction between the index value used by the data aggregator to reference values at a relay (identically indices 0-3 in relays A and B), and the indices used by the data aggregator in its role as a slave (0-7, for the values remapped from relays A and B). DNP3 configuration tables shared by the data aggregator and relays establish the understood location of values in a relay, while configuration tables shared by the data aggregator and the control station establish the indexing scheme assumed by the control station when it does its queries. As the labels 'master' and 'slave' suggest, DNP3 is designed to support masters continuously polling outstations. However, an outstation may also be configured for a 'report by exception' operation, in which it initiates a message to a master when a value it observes changes more than a given threshold or when a status (i.e., an on/off value) changes states.
RINSE
The Real-time Immersive Network Simulation Environment (RINSE) is a computer and communication systems simulator. It is based on a decade of research and development around the Scalable Simulation Framework (SSF) and SSFNet APIs (Liljenstam et al., 2006; Nicol et al., 2003; Cowie et al., 1999) . RINSE currently is based on the Parallel Real-time Immersive network Modeling Environment (PRIME) (Liu, 2008) implementations of SSF and SSFNet, with enhancements for the TCIP testbed.
RINSE models can describe systems at different levels of resolution. A detailed level simulation of a computer host or network router explicitly represents different layers of the software architecture, roughly following the OSI reference model, e.g., application layer, transport layer, network layer, data link layer, and physical layer. For each detailed host, it is required that SSFNet modules be identified to provide functionality for the physical, data link, and network layers. Other layers are added as needed. An abstract 'network' level of topology represents a network as a source and destination for traffic (as a connection endpoint for one or more router interfaces); its interface with the rest of the model is through routers at its boundary. Traffic can also be modelled abstractly with different levels of resolution. At the highest level one might allocate space for all of the bits of Ethernet frames, carrying all of the bits of IPv4 packets; at a more abstract level one can represent an IP packet in terms of its source and destination and the size of the data packet it carries. The simulator takes advantage of this by not allocating space for data, but accounts for the impact it has in queueing and service delays. More abstractly still one may describe a single flow of packets in terms of a source address, a destination address, and an adjustable rate at which bits flow from source to destination. The simulator dynamically changes flow rates as a function of the rate the source injects traffic, and the impact that congestion has on the flow as it passes through the network. And, more abstractly still, one can describe a set of flows with their aggregate flow rate. The aggregate may be split as the flow passes through the network, as demanded by routers analysing the range of destinations targeted by the set; likewise aggregate flows may be merged as they converge towards common destinations. These formalisms are useful for efficient simulation of flows between abstract networks in modelling of cyber-attacks where large volumes of traffic are involved (e.g., distributed denial of service, worms).
RINSE models are configured through a flexible mechanism known as the Domain Modelling Language (DML). A DML model is a list of attribute-value pairs, where the value associated with an attribute may itself be a list of attribute-value pairs. In this way a network is described as a list of networks and hosts, a host is described as a list of software layers, a software layer is described with a name (which identifies a module in the RINSE model library) and a list of parameters to be used when the module is installed and configured at model build time. For example, the transport layer in a host may be TCP, in which case parameters would include those typically used to configure TCP, e.g., maximum TCP segment size.
RINSE modules are written in C++. Base class characteristics require a layer within a host to instantiate virtual functions for passing packets and communicating with layers below and above it. There is no rigid specification of layering, i.e., the OSI model is not enforced. Prior to a set of runs, the simulator will build a model from reading DML file descriptions. Initialisation and configuration functions written by the module developer determines how to configure a module in the stack, as a function of context and DML parameters.
RINSE allows the integration of real devices into a model that includes simulated devices and networks. While a simulated host uses RINSE modules to provide the functionality of the host's operations, an emulated host executes outside of the simulator, but is tightly tied into the simulator. IP packets sent by the real host are captured and brought into RINSE. Along the way their addressing information is changed to reflect the IP address assignment used within RINSE. Emulated hosts are represented within RINSE as virtual hosts with simulated physical, data link, and network layer modules, but the top layer in the stack is an emulation module. A packet addressed (within RINSE) to a host with an emulation module reaches the host through RINSE, passes through the lower layers and on reaching the emulation layer is passed out (ultimately) to the physical device being represented. Likewise, a packet coming from an emulated host is given to the emulation layer in the stack of the RINSE host that represents it, where it is then pushed through lower layers to the network just as though it had originated from an Application layer in that stack. Example protocol stacks for a simulated host and an emulated host are illustrated in Figure 6 . (Liu et al., 2007) , packet capture is accomplished within the context of a Virtual Private Network (VPN) overlay network. The VPN is configured so that a unique VPN client is created for every real device whose traffic will be connected to RINSE. The usual role of a VPN client is to intercept traffic generated by an application, put a VPN wrapper around it, and forward the encapsulated packet to a VPN server. The server validates the destination coordinates of the encapsulated packet, and releases the packet to the network to travel to its intended address. VPNs are often used to transport traffic from a source outside a secured corporate network, into that network. Network address and protocol remapping is used to accomplish this. In our application the traffic from real devices is instead carried from 'real' networking space into the virtual RINSE networking space. An open-source VPN server is modified to map the IP addresses assigned to VPN clients to the internal RINSE coordinates used by the emulation hosts representing the applications inside of RINSE. Thus, for any packet generated by VPN client A with some IP address as the destination, the packet passes first from A to the VPN server. The server encapsulates that packet with a header for RINSE that describes the RINSE identity of the source. The packet is forwarded to RINSE, to be noticed by an I/O thread whose activation body passes the packet deeper into RINSE. Techniques are used within RINSE to mask (in part) the extra delays caused by passing the packets from process to process. The packet from VPN client A is delivered to the emulation layer of the host representing the device bound to A, and from there the packet travels through RINSE to the host specified in the destination address. Note the implicit assumption that the destination IP address is in the IP space defined and used within RINSE, implying the need either for a DNS server for the external application to map textual names to RINSE IP addresses, or careful configuration. So far we use the latter. The reverse path is followed when a packet within RINSE is addressed to and received by an emulation host. As we have seen already, the packet climbs the stack and reaches the emulation layer. That layer queues up the packet for attention by the I/O thread, which passes it to the VPN server. The VPN server forwards the packet to the corresponding VPN client.
The remaining issue is connecting the VPN client processes with the application processes. A clean way exists when the applications run on devices whose operating systems support the VPN client software. In this case installation of the VPN client modifies the protocol stack of the application host, inserting a connection to the VPN to grab on their way to the network interface, and insert packets as though they came a particular network interface. In our experience though either the privileges needed to install and use the VPN client are not readily available to the user, or the operating system does not support use of the VPN client. To address this we developed a proxy process that connects application to VPN client. The application must be reconfigured to point a particular connection to the proxy, rather than to the IP address it would have used had the VPN client been resident. The proxy accepts the packet, and copies it out to a new address bound to the VPN client. Both proxy and VPN client may reside on a host server that is distinct from the application host. Of course we support the reverse process of a packet from VPN server to VPN client to proxy to real application. Both application and proxy need configuration to establish these paths.
Integration
Each pair of testbed components (PowerWorld, Equipment, RINSE) are integrated with each other. Explanation is aided by the diagram in Figure 8 . 
PowerWorld-Equipment
PowerWorld exports a list of buses by their textual name (viewable on the screen), and their internal index (an integer) within PowerWorld. A bus always has an internal index, a text label is optional. As we noted earlier, our version of PowerWorld responds to queries for power grid state information. In our application, the information obtained from PowerWorld is precisely that information needed to simulate measurements made by a relay, which can be queried by and reported to a data aggregator: measured power at the specified bus, in units of megawatts and also megavars. The converter program that interfaces PowerWorld and the power grid equipment polls PowerWorld for the power at the simulated bus protected by the real relay and breaker. We have described already how the converter program transforms those values into inputs for the AMS, and how the converter program can notify PowerWorld of changes in the breaker status.
PowerWorld-RINSE
A converter program that is almost identical to the one interfacing PowerWorld and the equipment interfaces PowerWorld with RINSE. This program polls PowerWorld for the power measurements for all of the simulated relays configured by RINSE to have their power inputs obtained. PowerWorld expects a query to specify a bus by the internal PowerWorld index for it. The lines from the PowerWorld configuration file to both instances of the converter program highlight that the configuration contains a mapping of symbolic bus names with internal PowerWorld indexes, giving the converters an ability map between symbolic names for buses (which is crucial on the RINSE side) and PowerWorld representation. The link between Power World configuration and RINSE reflects the dependency of RINSE configuration on knowing the symbolic names of buses whose measurements are available to RINSE. Whereas the PowerWorld-Equipment converter program transforms power measurements into control signals for the AMS, the PowerWorld-RINSE converter program transforms power measurements from PowerWorld into simulated power values that the RINSE-simulated relay stores, and can report when queried by a simulated (or real) data aggregator. PowerWorld can also be notified of changes in the state of breakers controlled by relays simulated by RINSE.
RINSE-Equipment
The RINSE model can have a data aggregator (real or simulated) query data from the RINSE-simulated relays, and supports a simulated data aggregator responding to DNP3 requests from a real control station. Correspondingly, configuration information from the control station is needed by RINSE, and vice-versa. Substations that are completely simulated will have DNP3 mappings of relay values to a data aggregator's array; the mapping of relay values to array elements is needed by the EMS for its polling of virtual data aggregators. RINSE needs some network identity information for its configuration of the address translation that occurs when IP packets flow between RINSE and the control station (e.g., control station polling of virtual data aggregators within RINSE).
Use case
Finally, we describe a use case that is representative of how we are using the testbed. We have used it to alert operators to the need for strong controls on traffic that is allowed into, out of, and within a system. The use case involves network traffic generated by DNP3 polling. The baseline traffic involves periodic polling of a substation's data aggregator to devices within a substation, and a control station's polling of data aggregators throughout the control station's domain.
The use case demonstrates how poorly configured firewalls may allow an intruder into the network controlled by a control station, open a breaker, keep the control station from observing the changed state of the system and so fail to respond appropriately. The threat scenario is that an extortionist performs the penetration to prove his capability to interfere with the network. We used a preliminary version of this use case to demonstrate how a firewall analysis tool APT (Nicol et al., 2008) can help mitigate potential attacks.
A number of best practices recommendations (e.g., Stouffer et al., 2007; Kulpers and Fabro, 2006) for configuring process control networks suggest the creation of network zones, separated by firewalls. Figure 9 illustrates the concept. From the perspective of the corporate entity who owns and uses the process control network there are five isolated zones. The global internet is kept at bay with a firewall that admits only traffic that supports the corporate posture. This includes web queries, e-mail, and connections with applications within the corporate network that need specialised communication outside of the network. A so-called 'Demilitarised Zone' (DMZ) is created to separate the global internet from the global enterprise network. Servers that provide an interface to the global internet are placed here, e.g., web servers, Domain Name Service servers, e-mail servers. The idea of the DMZ is to allow access from the global internet to the internet-facing servers, but to otherwise restrict connections into the corporate system. This second level of separation is provided by a firewall between the corporate enterprise network, and the DMZ. The corporate network has need of data measured in the process control network. To limit and control the flow connections between them, another DMZ is created. Data that the corporate network requires is pushed out of the process control network onto servers in the DMZ (e.g., data librarians). The corporate network gets the needed data from the servers in the DMZ, thereby avoiding a direct connection with the process control network. Best practices for a network like this include recommendations designed to strictly segregate these network segments. Examples include:
1 The base firewall rule set should be deny all, permit none.
2 All 'permit' rules should be both IP address and TCP/UDP port specific.
3 Traffic should be prevented from transiting directly from the control network to the corporate network. All traffic should terminate in the DMZ.
4 Outbound packets from the control network or DMZ should be allowed only if those packets have a correct source IP address that is assigned to the control network or DMZ devices.
The first and second recommendations together imply that firewalls should be configured to describe precisely what traffic to admit, and to reject any packet that does not fit this description. The third recommendation limits outbound traffic from the process control network to servers in the DMZ between itself and the corporate network. The last recommendation is to check for spoofed source addresses in outbound traffic.
The problem of determining whether the configuration of a network's system of firewalls adheres to best practices is one that can in part be automated; indeed we are developing a tool (APT) that does exactly that (Nicol et al., 2008) . One of the uses of the TCIP lab is to demonstrate the effectiveness of a tool like APT by showing the sort of attack it can prevent.
The backdrop for the attack we demonstrate is DNP3 polling. The attack has several stages:
1 Within some substation, an operator on an ordinary computer surfs the web to a site that puts malicious software on the computer. This is the first breach of best practices, for the firewalls allow a connection initiated within the process control network to cross the DMZ separating process control and corporate networks.
2 The code loaded onto the substation host begins to map the process control network, meaning that through port scans and analysis of responses from queries made to devices in the network address space, the malware creates a list of active hosts, and to the extent possible, ports that are open on those devices and applications that may be resident. The malware communicates this list to a host owned by a malicious entity in the global internet. The same best practice recommendation is violated here as before -communication from within the process control network is allowed past the DMZ facing it.
3 The malicious entity analyses the result of the scanned network and realises that he has an 'in' to a process control network, by virtue of getting a signature from a relay. Through the host already penetrated he discovers by hand that the relay is configured with well-known default passwords, making possible an attack that logs into the relay and changes its configuration to open the breaker prematurely. Based on the signatures gathered, he crafts an attack that creates a botnet on vulnerable hosts within the process control network. He then attacks the vulnerable hosts and implants the botnet.
4 The attack is launched in two steps. A script is run that (1) logs into the relay and lowers the sensitivity threshold, in order to trigger an opening of the breaker, and (2) commands the botnets to flood the network with traffic. The objective is to change the topology of the electrical flows and potentially overload some other lines, but obscure the changed state from the control station. Under normal operation the control station will be alerted to the breaker opening by the time of the next DNP3 query to that substation (although it is also possible for the relay to be configured to alert the control station immediately). Operators view what has happened, how the flows distributed themselves automatically according to the laws of physics, and may further alter the flows by making controlled changes to the topology, e.g., to relieve a line that become overloaded following the breaker trip.
We have implemented most of this attack in the testbed. The control station uses DNP3 to poll a real data aggregator, and simulated data aggregators. The response of the simulated aggregators is canned, at the present time: a simulated aggregator responds to any DNP3 query with a legitimate response, albeit one that does not change. PowerWorld state is transferred to RINSE devices that represent relays and data aggregators; the traffic in the network is driven by the control station, is understood by the control station, and is displayed by the control station. For stage (1) in the attack, hosts connected to RINSE for emulation have reached through firewalls to the global internet. We have not yet pointed a substation monitor device at a malicious site, but easily could. For stage (2) we have simulated scanning within RINSE that determines which hosts respond on a network, and which ones have services that might be exploited. Hosts within RINSE carry information about the operating system and application services that are resident (at least simulated to be resident) on that host, and whether banner information is returned that can identify that OS or service. RINSE can assemble the sort of host/services map assumed in the use case. We have not simulated in any detail the act of the malicious entity attacking hosts as described in stage (3). Instead we configure the attacked hosts to have the botnet malware in their protocol stacks, with a switch (flipped at runtime) that indicates whether the module is 'present' or not. Implementation of the 'attack' consists of flipping that bit. In stage (4), an expect (Libes, 1994) script running on a real computer, connected through RINSE to the relay can log in to the relay and change a threshold. That same script can send a command to the originally subverted substation monitor, (which is configured to receive it), whose response is to send 'launch' commands to the compromised hosts identified to it in the message. The real relay opens the breaker, a fact reflected in the state returned to the AMS. The converter program connected to the AMS gets its status information, notices the change in state of the breaker, and reports this to PowerWorld. The simulated grid state is correspondingly altered, and the converter program between PowerWorld and RINSE gets the new state for the devices represented in RINSE. The traffic storm identified in stage (5) is simulated in RINSE. The botnet hosts have application layer modules that, when triggered by external command, enter loops where they flood the network with packets carried by UDP. The DNP3 traffic generated by the control network competes with the botnet traffic for bandwidth. Our experiments assumed 100 Mbs links; it was not difficult for 10 or so botnet hosts to clog the network so that almost all DNP3 queries originating at the control station time out. After a minute or so (roughly the time used to cycle through the network's data aggregators), the control station software flashed 'time-out' messages on all connections. Key elements of this attack required that the firewalls admit traffic in a way that violates best practice recommendations. We have used the preliminary implementation of this use case to show: that penetration and interference with network traffic is possible that the APT tool detects the network's failure to follow best practices that using APT to identify and correct the gaps in traffic coverage, a replay of the attack does not succeed.
Properly configured firewalls prohibit the first connection in the attack, where a browser within a subnetwork reaches through the first DMZ and passes through the corporate network to the global internet to touch an infecting site.
Summary
The TCIP testbed brings together a widely used simulator of electrical power generation and distribution (PowerWorld), real power grid equipment, and an emulator/simulator of computer and communication networks (RINSE). The power grid equipment reacts to simulated electrical flows from PowerWorld, and changes in the state of the power grid equipment affect the state of PowerWorld and the calculations it produces. RINSE represents the power grid devices within a virtual world that contains simulated devices. Real and simulated devices communicate with each other through RINSE, allowing for simulated network activity to impact the communication. In particular, the protocol used by the (real) power grid control station software to obtain power grid state information is carried by RINSE to the simulated devices being queried, and to the proxies of the real devices being queried. The simulated devices give simulated responses based on data obtained from PowerWorld, the proxies pass the requests out to the real devices, which respond using their real software. Those responses return to RINSE and are carried back to the control station proxy, who passes them back to the control station.
The testbed is designed to aid us in evaluating the effectiveness of security technology in a realistic setting. We describe a use cases that demonstrates that firewall configurations which fail to follow best practices recommendations can admit an intruder who can interfere with power grid operations, and that a firewall analysis tool can prevent such an attack.
The use case described are just one example of many that are possible. The value of the testbed is its unique ability to integrate simulators of physical systems, computer and communication network emulator/simulators, and real devices -both ordinary computers and specialised devices for the application domain. The integration allows us to construct very realistic contexts of very large systems within which we can evaluate the performance and effectiveness of emerging security technologies.
